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The Aouzou Strip: Adjudication of Competing Territorial Claims
in Africa by the International Court of Justice
INTRODUCTION
The Aouzou Strip is a 100 kilometer wide slice of desert which runs thelength of the border between Chad and Libya.' For 100 years the na-
tionality of the area has been disputed, and it was not until fairly recently
that the quarrelling parties agreed to a peaceful settlement of the border
dispute by the International Court of Justice (I.C.J.).2
The question arises, why the fuss over an area with land of few in-
habitants,3 where nothing grows?4 The answer lies primarily in the re-
gion's strategic importance.' In addition, the Aouzou Strip is rich in
resources of uranium and phosphates which have not yet been exploited.6
Chad and Libya have competing legal claims to the region. This
Note will present the historical facts surrounding this controversy, as
well as the international legal principles, thereby arriving at a conclusion
as to which country's case is the most meritorious. This note will not
discuss the political motives of the dispute over the Aouzou Strip.
I Libya Said to Annex Area of Chad, N.Y. Times, Sept. 8, 1975, at 3, col. 4.
2 Comarin, Tchad-Libye: A qui Appartient la Bande d'Aouzou?, JEUNE AFRiQUE 4 (Sept. 4,
1989).
3 Guillhaudis, Remarques d propos des recents conflits territoriaux entre ditats africains, 25 AN-
NUAIRE FRANgAIS DE Daorr INTERNATIONAL 223, 227 (1979) [hereinafter A.F.D.I.]. The majority
of inhabitants are Teda and Toubou tribesmen. Though Muslim, they have been historically hostile
to intruders from Libya. See Comarin, supra note 2, at 6. See also Brooke, African Disputes Pit Arab
vs. Black, N.Y. Times, June 5, 1988, at 15, col. 1. Due to the region's scarce population and histori-
cal animosity to Libya, this Note will not consider principles of self-determination. For a concurring
argument, see Guilhaudis, supra note 3. In addition, Guilhaudis asserts that the Libyan presence in
the Aouzou Strip is merely an expansionist challenge to territorial boundaries. Id at 229-30.
4 Alibert, L'affaire du Tchad 1980-1985, REVUE GtNtRALE DE DRorr INTERNATIONAL PUB-
LIC 345, 365 (1986) [hereinafter R.G.D.I.P.].
5 The Aouzou Strip provides a necessary launching point for the Libyan military to furnish
rebels in Chad and surrounding States with arms and various other supplies. See M. KELLEY, A
STATE IN DISARRAY: CONDrTIONS OF CHAD'S SURVIVAL 38 (1986). By aiding rebel groups, Colonel
Kadhafy intends to abolish colonial boundaries which hinder the success of Pan-Arabism, and to
unify an Arab and African nation. See Lemarchand, The Case of Chad, in THE GREEN AND THE
BLACK 106 (1988)[hereinafter The Case of Chad]. See also Lemarchand, The Crisis in Chad, in
AFRICAN CRISIS AREAS AND U.S. FOREIGN POLICY 239, 244-45, 252-53 (1985) [hereinafter The
Crisis in Chad].
6 Alibert, supra note 4, at 365.
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HISTORICAL BACKGROUND
In order to understand the origins of the conflict between Chad and
Libya over the Aouzou Strip, the histories of both Chad and Libya must
first be examined.
Chad is the largest and one of the most diverse countries of French
Equatorial Africa both in terms of population and area.7 The population
of Chad at 4.5 million' is comprised of more than 200 ethnic groups.9
However, the north and center-east of the country is predominantly
Arab and Muslim, while the south is generally Black and Christian. 0
The official languages of Chad are French and Arabic. 1 It was not until
1891 that the French first penetrated Africa in the area of what is now
Chad.12 By 1914, all of Chad had been conquered by the French, and was
made a French colony in 1920.13
The borders of Chad encircle 1,284,634 square kilometers, roughly
the size of Texas, Oklahoma and New Mexico combined.' 4 Within these
borders there are three climate zones - desert, sahel and tropical."5 Chad
is landlocked in central Africa, with Libya being its neighbor to the
north.16
The borders of Libya encircle 1,758,610 square kilometers of desert
and semidesert.17 Ninety-seven percent of Libya's 3.6 million inhabitants
are Sunni Muslim, and the official language is Arabic.' Libya was con-
quered in the sixteenth century by the Ottoman Turks, and remained
under their control until the Italian conquest in 1911.19
Since the times of the empires of Rome and Carthage, trans-Saharan
trade routes through Libya and Chad have existed.2" Populations moved
back and forth across the Chad-Libyan border in trade caravans as
7 BUREAU OF PUBLIC AFFAIRS, U.S. DEP'T OF STATE, BACKGROUND NOTES: CHAD 3 (Aug.
1988) [hereinafter BACKGROUND NOTES: CHAD].
8 I at 1.
9 Id. at 3.
10 Id.
1I Id. at 1.
12 Id. at 3.
13 Id. During the period between 1916-1929, France temporarily lost control of the Aouzou
Strip to rebel Senoussiste tribesmen. See also Comarin, supra note 2, at 6.
14 BACKGROUND NOTES: CHAD, supra note 7, at 1. This figure includes the 114,000 square
kilometers of the Aouzou Strip.
15 M. KELLEY, supra note 5, at 4.
16 Libya is comprised of three regions: Cyrenaica, Tripolitania and the Fezzan. G.A. Res. 289,
U.N. Doc. A/1251, at 10 (1949). All three regions will hereinafter be referred to as "Libya."
17 BUREAU OF PUBLIC AFFAIRS, U.S. DEP'T OF STATE, Pub No. 7815, BACKGROUND NOTES:
LIBYA 1 (Aug. 1985). [hereinafter BACKGROUND NOTES: LIBYA]. This figure does not include the
114,000 square kilometers of the Aouzou Strip. Comarin, supra note 2, at 4.
18 Comarin, supra note 2, at 1.
19 Id. at 3.
20 M. KELLEY, supra note 5, at 26.
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nomads, and later to spread the Islamic religion.2 The history of the
region is one of societies in movement, societies which consider the right
of passage more important than the right to camp.2 2 Therefore, the con-
cept of the border as a precise, identifiable line of demarcation between
territorial units is alien to these societies.
2 3
Prior to the complete conquest of Chad in 1914, France began nego-
tiating treaties in order to establish Chad's borders. The first of such trea-
ties was the June 14, 1898 Convention between France and Great
Britain.2' The Convention of 1898 served mainly to delimit possessions
west and east of the Niger River.25 In the subsequent March 21, 1899
Supplementary Declaration to the Convention of 1898,26 the northern
border of Chad was delimited for the first time and included the area
presently called the Aouzou Strip.27 The Declaration of 1899, concerning
Chad's northern border, was reaffirmed by Great Britain and France in
1919.28
Though the Declaration of 1899 defined Chad's northern border,
the Declaration did not include the one country to Chad's north which it
affected, Turkey. After the signing of the Declaration of 1899, Turkey
publicly denounced the treaty, stating that its historic rights extended as
far south as Lake Chad, and that under no circumstances would Turkey
21 The Case of Chad, supra note 5, at 107. The area between southern Libya and central Chad
became known as the Libyan hinterland. See infra note 29.
22 The Case of Chad, supra note 5, at 107. One of Libya's claims to the Aouzou Strip is based
on this historical interaction within the Arab Nation. See The Crisis in Chad, supra note 5, at 245 n.
4.
23 The Case of Chad, supra note 5, at 107.
24 Convention for the Delimitation of Possessions West and East of the Niger, June 14, 1898,
France-Great Britain, 1899 Gr. Brit. T.S. No. 15 (Cmd. 9334), 186 C.T.S. 313 [hereinafter Conven-
tion of 1898].
25 Id. Delimitation is "[tihe act of fixing, marking off, or describing the limits or boundary line
of territory." BLACK'S LAW DICTONARY, 385 (5th ed. 1979).
26 Declaration completing the foregoing Convention of June 14, 1898, Mar. 21, 1899, France-
Great Britain, 1899 Gr. Brit. T.S. No. 15 (Cmd. 9334), 186 C.T.S. 331 [hereinafter Declaration of
1899].
27 Id. art. 3, at 332-33. The pertinent text reads:
[To the north of the 15th parallel the French Zone shall be limited to the northeast and
east by a line which shall start from the point of the intersection of the Tropic of Cancer
with the 16th degree of longitude east of Greenwich.. . shall run thence to the south-east
until it meets the 24th degree of longitude east of Greenwich... and shall then follow the
24th degree until it meets, to the north of the 15th parallel of latitude, the frontier of
Darfur as it shall eventually be fixed.
id
28 Supplementary to the Declaration of March 21, 1899, and The Convention of June 14, 1898,
Respecting Boundaries West and East of the Niger, Sept. 8, 1919, United Kingdom-France, 1921
Gr. Brit. T.S. No. 6 (Cmd. 1239), 161, 165, 225 C.T.S. 480, 482 [hereinafter Boundary Convention
of 1919].
1991]
CASE W. RES. J. INTL LV
allow the French to occupy northern Chad.2 9 In any event, at the time of
the Declaration of 1899 neither Turkey nor France had control over
northern Chad.3°
On November 1, 1902, the Italian Minister of Foreign Affairs sent a
letter to the French Ambassador in Rome concerning Italian interests in
Libya.3 In this letter, the Italian government acknowledged the delim-
ited borders of the Declaration of 1899, and further declared that the
borders between Libya and Chad were not contrary to Italian interests in
the area.32 The French Ambassador replied by assuring Italy that the
Declaration of 1899 would be the extent of French expansion in central
Africa.33 However, Italy was not pleased with the Declaration of 1899,
and claimed that France had dealt Italy a bad hand.34 Italy believed that
it should have been made a party to the Declaration of 1899.
31
In the face of French advances northward, tribesmen from northern
Chad requested Turkish aid.36 Turkey responded by sending troops to
assist the tribesmen sometime between 1906 and 1911, and was success-
ful in deterring the French.37 Soon thereafter, Turkey began imposing its
government on the inhabitants, and the Turkish flag was raised.38 The
29 Comarin, supra note 2, at 5. Turkey sent a note to Paris stating that the area of northern
Chad belonged to Turkey's possession of Libya. The note's claim was based on the concept of the
hinterland, whereby a state in possession of coastal territory acquires more easily rights to uncon-
trolled inland territory. The claim was rejected by France, stating that the hinterland does not con-
stitute a right, but merely facilitates the acquisition of rights to territory. The French position was
that the border had to be delimited somewhere, and that the agreed upon limits in the Declaration of
1899 were fair for they allowed Turkey to claim the rest of the territory in southern Libya which was
still not in its possession. Chronique desfaits internationaux, 6 R.G.D.I.P. 307, 312-313 (1899) [here-
inafter Chronique desfaits]. For a complete discussion on the concept of the hinterland, see Paisant,
Les droits de la France au Niger, 5 R.G.D.I.P. 28 (1898).
30 Comarin, supra note 2, at 5.
31 11 ministro degli Esteri, Prinetti, alrambasciatore di Francia a Roma, Barrere [Letter from
the Minister of Foreign Affairs of Italy, Mr. Prinetti, to the Ambassador of France to Rome, Mr.
Barrere], 6 1 Documenti Diplomatici Italiani (Italy), 3rd Series, 1896-1906, No. 619, 428, 192 C.T.S.
156 [hereinafter Prinetti Letter]. Italy had been seriously considering colonization of Libya since
1881 as a "consolation prize" for the loss of Tunisia to the French. See C. SEGRk, FOURTH SHORE:
THE ITALIAN COLONIZATION OF LIBYA 20 (1974).
32 Prinetti Letter, supra note 31, at 428, 192 C.T.S. at 157.
33 L'ambasciatore di Francia a Roma, Barrire, al Ministro degli Esteri, Prinetti [Letter from
the Ambassador of France to Rome, Mr. Barrre, to the Minister of Foreign Affairs of Italy, Mr.
Prinetti], 6 1 Documenti Diplomatici Italiani (Italy), 3d Series, 1896-1906, No. 620, 429, 429-30, 192
C.T.S. 155, 155 [hereinafter Barrire Letter]. The exchange of the Prinetti Letter and the Barrire
Letter will hereinafter be called the Accord of 1902.
34 Chronique desfaits, supra note 29, at 313. Italy was alarmed by French and British penetra-
tion into the Libyan hinterland. See C. SEGRt, supra note 31, at 20.
35 Chronique desfaits, supra note 29, at 313.
36 Comarin, supra note 2, at 6.
37 Sources do not agree on the exact date of the Turkish intervention, but all fall sometime
between 1906-1911. B. LANNE, TCHAD-LIBYE: LA QUERELLE DES FRONTItRE 36-55 (1982).
38 Id. See also Comarin, supra note 2, at 6.
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result was an effective Turkish occupation of the region.
Turkey's efforts were short-lived though, for Italy declared war on
Turkey in 1911. 39 Within one year Italy had expelled the Turks from
Libya, and a treaty was signed on October 15, 1912, whereby Turkey
ceded to Italy all of its territorial possessions in Libya.4°
Though the actual borders of Libya had not been defined in the
Treaty of 1912, France soon came to the understanding that Italy was
including all the territory in Chad that had been under Turkish control
prior to the war in 1911 as part of Libya.41 Italy's desires of expansion in
Africa were certainly in contradiction with its official acknowledgement
in 1902 of the validity of the Declaration of 1899.42
In 1914, war broke out in Europe and the Allies began courting
neutral Italy.43 In order to secure Italy's entrance into the war against
the Axis powers, France and Great Britain agreed that if they should
increase their colonies in Africa at Germany's expense, France and Great
Britain would equitably resolve territorial disputes with Italy's African
colonies in favor of Italy.' In relying upon this agreement, Italy declared
war on the Axis powers.
After World War I, France was the first to honor its treaty obliga-
tions by extending the western border of Libya, and granting other terri-
tories to Italy in 1919.45 Great Britain later followed suit in 1924, and
resolved the border dispute in the Eritrea-Sudan frontier in favor of It-
39 J. WRIGHT, LIBYA 126-27 (1969).
40 Accordo preliminare di pace fra l'Italia e la Turchid sequito da un Firmano Imperiale, da un
Decreto Reale e Da un Trad6 Imperiale [Preliminary Accord of Peace Between Italy and Turkey
Resulting from an Imperial Firman, a Royal Decree and an Imperial Trade] Oct. 15, 1912, Italy-
Turkey, 22 Trattati e Convenzioni Jan. 1, 1912-Dec. 31, 1913 Italy 226, 217 C.T.S. 137, 139 [herein-
after Treaty of 1912].
41 Comarin, supra note 2, at 6. This territory included the Aouzou Strip and territory deeper
south into Chad.
42 See supra notes 31-35 and accompanying text where Italy officially states its interests in
Africa to be in conformity with the Declaration of 1899 and secretly is displeased. In addition, some
Italian colonists began to anticipate an empire which would extend from the Mediterranean Sea
down to Lake Chad in southern Chad. Comarin, supra note 2, at 6.
43 Comarin, supra note 2, at 6.
44 Agreement between France, Great Britain, Russia, and Italy providing for Italian Naval and
Military Co-operation with the Allied Powers and making certain Territorial and Other Arrange-
ments, Apr. 26, 1915, France-Great Britain-Russia-Italy, art. 13, 221 Parry's T.S. 56, 60 [hereinafter
Treaty of London]. Libya was one of the Italian colonies specifically mentioned in article 13. Id. art
XIII.
The term "equitable" was not defined in the Treaty of London, and an adjudicatory body was
not formed to determine which concessions would be equitable.
45 Accordo concluso per regolare alcune questioni pendenti concernenti gli interessi francesi e
quelli italiani in Africa [Conclusive Accord Resolving Some Pending Questions Concerning French
and Italian Interests in Africa], Sept. 12, 1919, France-Italy, 25 Trattati e Convenzioni (Italy) 3, 3-7
(1919) [hereinafter the Accord of 1919]. Nevertheless the French concessions were minor and the
Aouzou Strip remained in French possession.
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aly.46 Questions about the 1924 agreement were clarified by treaty, again
in favor of Italy.47
The Accord of 1919 with France did not satisfy Italy. Italian de-
mands that the borders of southern Libya extend as far south as Lake
Chad grew more fervent.48 The Fascist Mussolini was now in control in
Italy. France, desiring to lure Mussolini away from Hitler, announced
that it was willing to allow further concessions to Italy in Africa.4 9
On January 7, 1935, the French Foreign Affairs Minister Pierre La-
val and Mussolini met in Rome. In accordance with the Treaty of
London, Laval and Mussolini signed the Treaty of Rome which revised
the Accord of 1919 and specifically ceded to Italy the area now called the
Aouzou Strip. ° In Article 7 of the Treaty of Rome, both parties agreed
to have the Treaty ratified and that the Treaty would enter into force
when the instruments of ratification were exchanged in Rome."
Public opinion in France was exuberant and the French National
Assembly was very pleased that Laval had succeeded in luring Italy away
from Germany. 2 On March 26, 1935, the National Assembly approved
the Treaty of Rome and passed a law allowing the French President Al-
bert Lebrun to ratify and execute it.5 3 Lebrun thereafter ratified the
Treaty of Rome.54
The Italian Parliament approved the Treaty of Rome on May 29,
1935."5 King Victor-Emmanuel and Mussolini then ratified it on June 13,
46 Exchange of Notes Between Italy and the United Kingdom Approving the Agreement for
the Rectification of a Section of the Eritrea-Sudan Frontier, May 19, 1924, Italy-United Kingdom,
1924 Gr. Brit. T.S. No. 29 (Cmd. 2222), 28 L.N.T.S. 497.
47 Treaty Regulating Certain Questions Concerning the Boundaries of Their Respective Terri-
tories in East Africa, July 15, 1924, Italy-United Kingdom, 1925 Gr. Brit. T.S. No. 29 (Cmd. 2427),
36 L.T.S. 379, No. 936.
48 Comarin, supra note 2, at 7.
49 B. LANNE, supra note 37, at 126.
5o Trattato relativo al regolamento dei loro interessi in Africa [Treaty Regulating Respective
Interests in Africa], Jan. 7, 1935, France-Italy, art. 2,49 Trattati e Convenzioni Jan. 1 -Dec. 31, 1935
(Italy) 16, 17-18 [hereinafter Treaty of Rome]. The official French rdsumd of article 2 of the Treaty
of Rome, found in 42 R.G.D.I.P. 24 (1935), reads:
The frontier separating Libya from French West Africa and French Equatorial Africa will
be determined by a line which, starting from Tummo... will meet the western frontier of
the English-Egyptian Sudan at the intersection of 24 degrees longitude east of Greenwich
and 18 degrees 45 minutes latitude north. This line places Aouzou within Italian territory.
[Translation by author].
For a map detailing the names of the towns mentioned in article 2 and depicting the new border, see
B. LANNE, supra note 37, at 134.
51 Treaty of Rome, supra note 50, art. 7, at 19.
52 B. LANNE, supra note 37, at 135-47.
53 Id. at 147.
54 Id.
55 Id. at 167.
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1935.6 The instruments of ratification, however, were never exchanged
between Italy and France.57 The Aouzou Strip was to never come under
Italian control."8
Italy was not satisfied with the Treaty of Rome.59 Italian ambitions
in Africa soon made this clear to France. On December 28, 1935, Laval
recounted to the French government that Mussolini had told him that he
"did not want to continue collecting deserts."' France remained uncer-
tain as to whether Italy considered the Treaty of Rome valid.61
On December 17, 1938, Italy finally informed France that it consid-
ered the Treaty of Rome to be void and not in force.62 Italy based its
allegations on French noncompliance with Article 1 of the Treaty of
Rome.63 The convention in Article 1 to resolve the rights of Italians liv-
ing in Tunisia had never been convened and the agreement to be reached
at the convention was to enter into force on the same day as the Treaty of
Rome.6' However, Italy did leave open the possibility of renegotiation.6 5
The immediate French response refuted the Italian allegations, coun-
tering that it was not France's fault the convention had never taken place
and that Italy was deceitfully trying to place blame for the Treaty's fail-
ure on France.66 The French response did not comment on renegoti-
ation.67 On June 10, 1940, Italy declared war on France and Great
Britain.
On February 10, 1947, the Allies made peace with Italy.6" In the
peace treaty, Italy renounced all rights and title to the Italian territorial
possessions in Africa.69 In addition, the treaty granted the Allies the au-
56 Id. at 168.
57 Id.
58 Comarin, supra note 2, at 7.
59 B. LANNE, supra note 37, at 150.
60 Id at 154-55 [translation by author].
61 Id at 154-68.
62 La note italieune du 17 dcembre 1938 et la response frangaise: la note italienne [The Italian
Note of December 17, 1938 and the French Response: the Italian Note], Dec. 17, 1938, Journal des
Debats (Mar. 31, 1939). This Note was from the Italian Minister of Foreign Affairs, Count Ciano, to
the French Ambassador to Rome, Frangois Poncet. The Count's letter stated in pertinent part:
"The Treaty of January 7, 1935 which... was never executed... is void of content and obviously
cannot be considered today as being in force" [translation by author].
63 Id
64 Id
65 Iad
66 La note italienne du 17 d6cembre 1938 et ]a response frangaise: la response frangaise [the
Italian Note of December 17, 1938, and the French Response: The French Reponse], Journal des
Debats (Mar. 31, 1939). This reponse was from the French Ambassador to Rome, Frangois Poncet,
to the Italian Minister of Foreign Affairs, Count Ciano.
67 Id
68 Treaty of Peace with Italy, Feb. 10, 1947, Allied and Associated Powers-Italy, art. 23,
T.I.A.S. No. 1648, at 138, 49 U.N.T.S. No. 747 126. 139.
69 Id. By 1942 Libya had fallen into Allied hands. Since that time Libya was under French and
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thority to determine the boundaries of the former Italian possessions.7"
The treaty further provided that all treaties between Italy and the Allies
before World War II were void, except for those an Allied power may
wish to keep in force or revive.71 In keeping with this provision of the
treaty, France notified Italy of all the prior treaties they deemed to be in
force; the Treaty of Rome was not one of them.72 Therefore, Italy lost its
colony of Libya and the Treaty of Rome was certainly no longer valid.
In order to resolve the manner in which Libya's borders should be
delimited, the United Nations (U.N.) passed a resolution recommending
that the delimitation of the borders between Chad and Libya be directly
negotiated between France and Libya.7" Soon thereafter, France began
negotiating with the newly independent Libya. On August 10, 1955, the
two countries agreed74 to honor the Convention of 1898, the Declaration
of 1899, the Accord of 1902, the Accord of 1919, and the Boundary Con-
vention of 1919 between France and Great Britain.75 There was abso-
lutely no reference made to the Treaty of Rome76 and Libya thereby
impliedly conceded that the Aouzou Strip belonged to Chad. It was fur-
ther agreed that the treaty would remain in force for twenty years. 77
Both France and Libya ratified the treaty and the instruments of ratifica-
tion were exchanged on February 20, 1957.78
Chad became an independent country on August 11, 1960.19 Upon
obtaining independence, Chad declared intangible"° its inherited
boundaries.8 "
The principle of the intangibility of borders was soon after incorpo-
British military authority. See H. VILLARD, LIBYA: THE NEW ARAB KINGDOM OF NORTH AFRICA
29 (1956). Unable to decide who should be the trustee of Libya, the matter was deferred to the
United Nations ("U.N."). On November 21, 1949, the U.N. passed a resolution calling for a united,
independent Libya by 1952. G.A. Res. 289, 4 U.N. GAOR Supp. (No. 16) (250th plen. mtg.) at 10,
U.N. Doec. A/1251 (1949).
70 Treaty of Peace with Italy, supra note 68, Annex XI, at 214.
71 Id. art. 44, at 143.
72 B. LANNE, supra note 37, at 184.
73 G.A. Res. 392, 5 U.N. GAOR Supp. (No. 20) at 22, U.N. Doec. A/1775 (1950). Libya had
gained its independence on December 24, 1951. BACKGROUND NOTES: LIBYA, supra note 17, at 1.
74 Traite d'amiti6 et de bon voisinage [Treaty of Friendship and Good Neighborly Relations],
Aug. 10, 1955, France-Libya, J.0., No. 57-436, at 3661 [hereinafter Treaty of 1955].
75 Id. Annex 1. Annex 1 states that: "The two High Contracting Parties recognize that the
boundar[y] separating the territory of Libya... from French Equatorial Africa [Chad is] defined...
in the following [five international agreements listed in the text] [translation by author]."
76 Id.
77 Id. art. 11.
78 Id. at 3661.
79 B. LANNE, supra note 37, at 221.
80 Intangible borders refers to the inviolability and integrity of the territory of a State. Alibert,
supra note 4, at 366.
81 B. LANNE, supra note 37, at 222.
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rated into Article 3 of the Charter of the newly formed Organization of
African Unity (O.A.U.). 2 The O.A.U. was founded on May 25, 1963,
and both Libya and Chad are member states.8 3 The O.A.U.'s preamble
stresses the preservation of the sovereignty and territorial integrity of the
member states.
8 4
The O.A.U. reconvened in Cairo from July 17 to July 21, 1964 in
order to clarify the meaning of Article 3 of the Charter. A resolution was
passed, to which Chad and Libya were signatories, stating that all mem-
bers would commit themselves to respect the borders existing at the mo-
ment they achieved independence.5 "This is the triumph of the
principle of boundary succession, also known as uti possidetis.'"8
On September 1, 1969, Colonel Kadhafy overthrew the monarchy of
King Idris and became the new leader of Libya. 7 Since 1965, a civil war
had been waging in Chad and Colonel Kadhafy began supporting one
revolutionary group called FROLINAT.8s
By 1971 Chad had lost control of the Aouzou Strip.89 Libya began
occupying the area in the first half of 1973. 90 It was then rumored that
Colonel Kadhafy and Chadian President Tombalbaye had signed a secret
agreement in 1972 whereby Chad ceded the Aouzou Strip to Libya in
exchange for twenty-eight million francs and Libya's guarantee that it
would stop funding FROLINAT.9' It is fact, however, that negotiations
had taken place, and that Colonel Kadhafy did agree to withdraw sup-
82 The Charter of the Organization of African Unity [hereinafter O.A.U. Charter], reprinted in
A. J. PEASLEE, INTERNATIONAL GOVERNMENTAL ORGANIZATIONS, vol. 2, pt. 1, 1165-76 (1974).
83 A.J. PEASLEE, Organization of African Unity, in INTERNATIONAL GOVERNMENTAL ORGA-
NIZATIONS, vol. 2, pt. 1, 1160, 1164 (1974).
84 O.A.U. Charter, supra note 82, at 1165. The Charters preamble also makes reference to the
principle of self-determination of peoples. Id However, the O.A.U. has been criticized for strictly
adhering to uti possidetis, and failing to reconcile the preservation of territorial boundaries from
independence with self-determination. Guilhaudis, supra note 3, at 240-43.
Conversely, the International Court of Justice (I.CJ.), subject to the factors limiting its discre-
tion in infra note 170, will interpret uti possidetis in light of principles of self-determination. The
rationale is that the I.C.J. desires an equitable judgment, thereby promoting world order. See Fron-
tier Dispute Judgment (Burkina Faso v. Mali), 1986, I.C.J. 554, 661-63 [hereinafter Frontier Dispute
Judgment]. In any event, since self-determination is not at issue in the present case, possible mitiga-
tion of the effects of uti possdetis to Chad's territorial title will not be discussed. See Guilhaudis,
supra note 3, at 22343, explaining why self-determination is not an issue in the present case.
85 O.A.U. Resolution AHG/16-1, only denounced publicly by Somalia, see Borella, Organisa-
tions internationales regionales, Le Regionalisme Africain en 1967, A.F.D.I. 621, 625 (1964).
86 Borella, supra note 85, at 625 [translation by author].
87 BACKGROUND NOTES: LIBYA, supra note 17, at 3.
88 FROLINAT is comprised mainly of Muslim tribesmen of Arabic origin from northern
Chad. See B. LANNE, supra note 37, at 228. FROLINAT is the abbreviation for the Front de Libera-
tion National Tchadien. The Case of Chad, supra note 5, at 111.
89 B. LANNE, supra note 37, at 228.
90 l
91 Comarin, supra note 2, at 10.
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port from the FROLINAT and provide Chad with financial assistance if
Chad would sever relations with Israel.92 On November 28, 1972 Presi-
dent Tombalbaye broke relations with Israel.93
Libyan occupation of the Aouzou Strip did not become public until
May 8, 1975 when a French newspaper, Le Figaro, reported that Libyan
troops had seized control of the northern frontier of Chad.9 4 By Septem-
ber 8, 1975, it was reported that Libya had annexed the area pursuant to
the secret agreement between Colonel Kadahfy and President
Tombalbaye. 95 However, the next day Libya denied the annexation and
stated that the report was "a pure invention and a flagrant colonialist
attempt to sow discord and to poison the atmosphere between brotherly
African countries."96 It would follow, therefore, that Libya was denying
the existence of any secret agreement.
It was not until 1977 that Chad publicly complained of the Libyan
presence, stating: "Aouzou is an integral part of Chad. We will never
accept Libyan occupation in this area." 97 Libya did not publicly counter
the Chadian statement until 1980 when Colonel Kadhafy declared:
"Aouzou is a Libyan oasis and its inhabitants would not understand if
someone were to tell them that they are Chadian and not Libyan."98
Finally, on October 30, 1987, the O.A.U. convened an ad hoc com-
mittee to determine the nationality of the Aouzou Strip.99 Surprisingly,
Libya presented a photocopy of a letter from President Tombalbaye to
Colonel Kadhafy dated November 18, 1972.10' In pertinent part, the let-
ter states: "In my position as legal President of Chad, I affirm to you that
the Aouzou Strip was and will be, without any doubt, an integral part of
Libyan territory." 101 Libya, however, was not able to furnish the original
letter and there is much skepticism as to the validity of the photocopy. 102
It certainly was timely for Libya to have presented the letter before the
92 The Case of Chad, supra note 5, at 143.
93 Id.
94 M. KELLY, supra note 5, at 36.
95 Libya Said to Annex an Area of Chad, supra note 1 at 3, col. 4.
96 Libya Denies News Report She Annexed Part of Chad, N.Y. Times, Sept. 9, 1975, at 9, col. 1.
97 Statement by then President of Chad and leader of the First Army of the FROLINAT,
M.G. Oueddei [translation by author]; see Alibert, supra note 4, at 366. Tombalbaye had been de-
posed and assassinated on April 13, 1975 whereby Oueddei acceded to power. B. LANNE, supra note
37, at 231. In 1982, Oueddei was displaced during a military takeover by the present President of
Chad, Hiss~ne Habr6. Alibert, supra note 4, at 372. Habr6 was the leader of the Second Army of the
FROLINAT and he had continually denounced the Libyan occupation from its beginning. See
Comarin, supra note 2, at 10.
98 Alibert, supra note 4, at 365 n. 95 [translation by author].
99 The full letter has been reproduced in Comarin, supra note 2, at 9.
100 Id.
101 Id. at 9 [translation by author].
102 Id. at 10.
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O.A.U., twelve years after the death of the only person who could have
verified it, former President Tombalbaye.
The O.A.U. ad hoe committee has yet to make an official declara-
tion as to whom the Aouzou Strip belongs as a result of Libyan attempts
to delay such a declaration. 103 The ad hoe committee has, however, rec-
ognized the alleged letter by President Tombalbaye as "pertinent since it
specifically states that the Aouzou Strip is part of Libyan territory."'"I 4
The conflict between Libya and Chad reached world wide attention
on December 15, 1980, when Libyan and rebel troops captured
N'Djamena, the capital of Chad far in the south."15 French aid to Chad,
comprised of weapons and troops, helped Chad repel the Libyan ad-
vances. 106 By 1987, Chad had regained all of its territory as far north as
the Aouzou Strip, but not including the Aouzou Strip."0 7 After heavy
losses and waning support at home, Libya restored diplomatic ties with
Chad on October 3, 1988, and agreed to negotiate a peaceful settlement
to the dispute over the Aouzou Strip. 08
The culmination of these negotiations resulted in the signing of the
Accord for the Peaceful Resolution of the Territorial Dispute in Algiers
on August 31, 1989.109 The Accord calls for a cease-fire and the resolu-
tion of the dispute by political means within one year.10 If the two coun-
tries have not come to a settlement within that time period, they will
have conferred jurisdiction on the I.C.J. to determine the nationality of
the Aouzou Strip."'
INTERNATIONAL LEGAL PRINCIPLES
Libya and Chad both base their competing claims to the Aouzou
Strip upon several historical facts. Libya has advanced claims based on
its Turkish and Italian heritages," 2 the Treaty of Rome of 1935, 13 and
103 Id. at 9.
104 Id. [translation by author].
105 M. KELLEY, supra note 5, at 17.
106 Id at 18.
107 Chad had temporarily captured the village of Aouzou. See Lewis, France Refuses to Back
Chad Offensive, N.Y. Times, Aug. 11, 1987, at 3, col. 5. However, by virtue of a truce agreement
administered by the O.A.U., Libya presently controls most of the Aouzou Strip as it has done since
1973. See Mdlongwa, African Ministers Call for End to Chad-Libya Conflict, RE TER L1BR. REP.
(July 21, 1989) (Lexis, Nexis library, Wires file).
108 Ibrahim, Libya and Chad Restore Ties and Vow to Settle Dispute Peacefully, N.Y. Times,
Oct. 4, 1988, at A8, col. 1.
109 Accord cadre sur le r~glement pacifique du dift'rend territorial [Accord for the Peaceful
Resolution of the Territorial Dispute], Aug. 31, 1989, Chad-Libya, 94 R.G.D.I.P. 548 (1990), 29
I.L.M. 15 (1990) [hereinafter Peaceful Resolution of 1989].
110 Id. arts. 1, 4.
111 Id art. 2(a).
112 Alibert, supra note 4, at 365-66.
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the secret agreement between Chad and Libya of 1972.114 Chad relies
upon the Convention of 1898, the Declaration of 1899, the Boundary
Convention of September 8, 1919, the exchange of the letters of Decem-
ber 17 and 25, 1938, and the Treaty of 1955.115 Discovering which coun-
try holds valid title to the Aouzou Strip will be determined by applying
the international legal principles to the historical facts.
There are several ways in which a State may acquire title to terri-
tory. For the purposes of this Note, however, only four will be examined:
occupation, cession, uti possidetis and conquest." 6
Occupation
Occupation requires establishing sovereignty over a territory which
is not under the control of another State." 7 In the nineteenth and early
twentieth centuries, a territory inhabited by a people judged to possess a
civilization inferior to that of the European powers was considered terra
nulliusl18 and therefore subject to occupation. Under the modern view,
113 Id. at 366.
114 Comarin, supra note 2, at 8.
115 Alibert, supra note 4, at 366.
116 Under international law, there are five accepted ways of acquiring territory: occupation,
accretion, prescription, cession and conquest. I. BROWNLIE, PRINCIPLES OF PUBLIC INTERNA-
TIONAL LAW 134 (3d ed. 1979). Utipossidetis is a derivative mode of acquisition of territory which is
only binding upon States by agreement. 2 DIGEST OF INTERNATIONAL LAW 1086 (M. Whiteman
ed. 1963) [hereinafter 2 Whiteman].
Title by accretion involves the addition of territory, usually by natural causes, to territory al-
ready under the sovereignty of the acquiring State. J. STARKE, AN INTRODUCTION TO INTERNA-
TIONAL LAW 192 (8th ed. 1976). This form of acquisition does not apply in the instant case since
new territory has not been added to the already existing territory.
Title by prescription relates to territorial acquisition by continued, prolonged, and peaceful
occupation by one State of the territory belonging to another State. G. VON GLAHN, LAW AMONG
NATIONS, 277 (3d ed. 1977). Prescription requires that in order for the occupying State to acquire
title, the occupying State must not encounter protests by the State whose territory is being occupied.
Id The amount of time which must pass before prescription may confer title depends upon whether
there is a conviction that the present condition of the territory is in conformity with international
order. 1 OPPENHEIM'S INTERNATIONAL LAW 576 (H. Lauterpacht 8th ed. 1955) [hereinafter Op-
PENHEIM]. In the Island of Palmas case (Neth. v. U.S.), 2 R. Int'l Arb. Awards, 829, 869 (1928), the
international arbitral court determined that 200 years of continued, peaceful occupation was suffi-
cient to confer title.
In the present case, the only point in time where prescription could operate is from 1973 to
1977. This is since Libya's occupation began in 1973 and Chad subsequently protested the occupa-
tion in 1977. However, four years of peaceful occupation certainly is not a sufficient amount of time
to confer title by prescription, especially since Chad had been preoccupied with its civil war. In
addition, most African States continue to denounce Libya's occupation of the Aouzou Strip. See
generally 38 U.N. SCOR (2419th mtg.), U.N. Doc. S/PV 2419 (1983). This discord amongst the
African States is evidence that Libyan nationality of the Aouzou Strip would disrupt international
order, thereby precluding Libya from acquiring title to the territory by prescription.
117 J. STARKE, supra note 116, at 185.
118 G. VON GLAHN, supra note 116, at 274.
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land inhabited by organized tribes cannot be considered as terra nullius,
and valid title to the territory may only be acquired by local agreements
with the rulers of the tribes. 1 9
In order to acquire valid title to territory by occupation, the State
must first demonstrate its intention to act as sovereign. 120 Nothing less
than a permanent intention to assume control is required. 121 One means
by which a State may express its permanent intention is to notify other
interested States of its claims.12 2 Notification may, for example, be effec-
tuated by treaties, diplomatic correspondence, and official proclamations.
The second requirement necessary to acquire valid title is the actual
exercise or display of authority over the territory.12 3 Evidence of these
acts are satisfied by effective possession and control through extension of
the State's government and military to the territory.124 Treaties delimit-
ing boundaries with other States recognizing the State's sovereignty may
also be evidence of authority.125 The complete establishment of territorial
sovereignty may be prolonged so long as there is a "progressive intensifi-
cation of State control." 126
Nevertheless, when there are competing claims to a territory, valid
title encompasses only that land which has been effectively occupied.12 7
It follows therefore that a State's claims based on the hinterland 128 and
the establishment of a sphere of influence alone do not vest territorial
rights in the State.129 Once a territory has been effectively occupied, no
other State may acquire title to the territory through occupation. 130
As a State acquires a territory through occupation, it may lose its
territory by dereliction.131 Dereliction is the complete abandonment of
territory by a State with the intention of withdrawing forever. 13 2 Should
a State be temporarily forced out of a territory due to a revolt by natives,
the State does not lose title to the territory if it intends to retake
possession. 13
3
In 1899, neither Turkey nor France displayed an effective occupa-
119 J. STARKE, supra note 116, at 185.
120 Legal Status of Eastern Greenland (Den. v. Nor.), 1933 P.C.IJ. (Ser. A/8) No. 53, at 46.
121 J. STARKE, supra note 116, at 186.
122 Id.
123 Legal Status of Eastern Greenland, supra note 120, at 46.
124 I.G. SCHWARZENBERGER, INTERNATIONAL LAW 298 (3d ed. 1957).
125 J. STARKE, supra note 116, at 186.
126 Island of Palmas case (Neth. v. U.S.), 2 R. Int'l Arb. Awards, 829, 867 (1928).
127 OPPENHEIM, supra note 116, at 560.
128 See supra note 29 for an explanation of the hinterland.
129 OPPENHEIM, supra note 116, at 561-62.
130 Id at 562.
131 Id at 579.
132 Ia at 579-80.
133 IJd at 580; see also I. BROWNLIE, supra note 116, at 148-49.
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tion of northern Chad. By the then prevailing standards, northern Chad
was terra nuiius. It follows that the claim by Turkey to the Libyan hin-
terland in northern Chad did not grant Turkey legal title. Reciprocally,
France's Declaration of 1899 did not vest it with title to northern Chad.
Acquisition of title did not occur until 1906 when Turkey effectively oc-
cupied northern Chad, thereby vesting Turkey with title. In 1912 Tur-
key's withdrawal from northern Chad extinguished its claims to the
territory. The Treaty of 1912 evidenced a Turkish intent never to return
to northern Chad. Hence, Turkey lost sovereignty by dereliction and
northern Chad once again became terra nullius.134
The subsequent French occupation in 1914 of northern Chad con-
ferred upon France valid title to the territory. The Boundary Conven-
tion of 1919 with Great Britain reaffirming the Declaration of 1899, and
the imposition of colonial status in 1920 on all of Chad was evidence of
French intentions to maintain its control over northern Chad. 135
Therefore, France held valid title to all of Chad, including the
Aouzou Strip. Libyan arguments of ownership of the Aouzou Strip based
on the Turkish occupation are meritless due to the dereliction by Turkey.
Cession
Cession of territory by one State to another State involves the com-
plete transfer of sovereignty of the ceded territory. 136 A State may not
transfer more rights to a territory than it actually possesses. 37 Cession
will become effective only after sovereignty has actually been trans-
ferred. 38 The full consent of the respective governments is mandatory to
effectuate the cession. 3
9
Cession may only be completed pursuant to a treaty between the
ceding State and the acquiring State.Y" In addition, a treaty of cession is
not considered valid until all the provisions for approval and ratification
agreed upon in the treaty have been performed.' 4 ' A State is not legally
obligated to ratify a treaty, 42 nor is a State bound to a ratified treaty
until the instruments of ratification have been exchanged. '
43
134 See supra notes 29-40 and accompanying text.
135 See supra notes 13, 28 and accompanying text.
136 OPPENHEIM, supra note 116, at 547.
137 Island of Palmas case, 2 R. Int'l Arb. Awards at 829, 842.
138 2 Whiteman, supra note 116, at 1088.
139 THE AMERICAN SOCIETY OF INTERNATIONAL LAW, INTERNATIONAL LAW IN THE
TWENTIETH CENTURY 298 (L. Gross ed. 1969) [hereinafter AMERICAN SOCIETY].
140 OPPENHEIM, supra note 116, at 548. However, AMERICAN SOCIETY, supra note 139, at
298, states that there is not a prescribed manner in which cession must take place.
141 C. FENWICK, INTERNATIONAL LAW 523 (4th ed. 1965).
142 Digest of International Law 50 (M. Whiteman ed. 1970) [hereinafter 14 Whiteman].
143 Id. at 47. This is, of course, subject to a provision in the treaty to the contrary.
V/ol. 23:147
THE AOUZOU STRIP
The municipal law of States has absolutely no bearing upon interna-
tional law governing cession. 144 Statements by the diplomatic representa-
tive of a State to another State pertaining to a question falling within his
province is binding on the diplomat's State.14 A ceding State cannot re-
nege on its own grant. 1 The rationale behind this principle is that the
government of a State has the fullest opportunity to study a treaty and
decide whether it has the constitutional power to bind its State to the
treaty.147 This rationale follows from the general notion that a State un-
derstands its own laws better than another State could. "[A]ny failures to
comply with constitutional provisions in entering into a treaty will be the
clear responsibility of the Government of the State concerned."14  The
principle derives its acceptance from the fact that many States have tried
to rescind treaties, based on noncompliance with their constitutions, in
order to escape from their treaty obligations. 49 In addition, if a con-
tracting State is reasonably ignorant of the latter State's constitutional
defect in the treaty, the contracting State may assume the treaty to be
proper and hold the latter to the obligations of the treaty.150
However, where municipal rules contain constitutional restrictions
on the Government, treaties by the Head of Government or Head of
State in violation of the State's constitutional restrictions are not binding
upon the State if the "violation was manifest and concerned a rule of its
internal law of fundamental importance."15 ' The test adopted, to deter-
mine which violation is manifest, is that violation which "would be ob-
jectively evident to any State conducting itself in the matter in
accordance with normal practice in good faith."' 52 Therefore, the test
requires that a negotiating State should have known that the agent of the
other State could not have had the requisite authority.
It thus follows that in 1912, when Turkey ceded its possession of
Libya to Italy, Italy acquired all of what Turkey possessed, there in-
cluded northern Chad. However, the Italian Minister of Foreign Affairs'
official letter to France in 1902,13 acknowledging and agreeing to the
144 OPPENHEIM, supra note 116, at 547.
145 Legal Status of Eastern Greenland, supra note 120, at 71. This principle is known as recog-
nition - where a State, which has recognized the title to a territory by another State, is estopped
from contesting the title to the territory at a later date. AMERICAN SOCIETY, supra note 139, at 295-
96.
146 J. STARKE, supra note 116, at 193.
147 14 WHITEMAN, supra note 142, at 14.
148 Ird at 14-15.
149 Id at 15.
150 Id at 261.
151 Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, art. 46, para. 1, opened for signature May 23,
1969, 1155 U.N.T.S. 331, reprinted in 8 I.L.M. 679 (entered into force Jan. 27, 1980).
152 Id at art. 46, para. 2.
153 See supra notes 31-32 and accompanying text.
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northern boundaries of Chad as set forth in the Declaration of 1899, pre-
cluded Italy from asserting its territorial rights to the region since the
Italian Foreign Minister made a representation to the French which
clearly fell within his authority. 154 Thus, Italy could not have legally ac-
quired title to northern Chad; the region of northern Chad legally be-
came French by occupation in 1914.
In 1935, the Aouzou Strip was not ceded to Italy since the required
exchange of the instruments of ratification had never taken place pursu-
ant to Article 7 of the Treaty of Rome. In addition, this "cession" never
became effective since Italy had never exercised any sovereignty over the
area, and France continued to occupy it. 155
The unratified Treaty of Rome was to never be considered again in
future negotiations between France and Italy, and later Libya. Pursuant
to the Treaty of Peace with Italy of 1947, France notified Italy of all
treaties which were to remain in force. The Treaty of Rome, of course,
was not among them. The subsequent Treaty of 1955, where France and
Libya agreed to the boundaries set forth in the Declaration of 1899,
demonstrated an implied Libyan renunciation of claims to the Aouzou
Strip. Thus, Libya acknowledged that the Aouzou Strip belonged to
Chad. 156
According to Article 1 of the Constitution of the Republic of Chad,
"Chad is a sovereign Republic, one and indivisible." 157 Concerning the
President, the Constitution proclaims him to be "the Head of State and
of the Government." ' In addition, the President is the "guarantor
of.. .the integrity of the territory of the Republic... ."159 International
agreements of a legislative nature may only be ratified by a law."6 Au-
thorization to ratify international agreements contrary to the Constitu-
tion may only be done pursuant to a constitutional amendment.1 61
154 The letter is virtually identical in import as that from the Norwegian Foreign Minister
renouncing Norway's claims to Greenland. In Legal Status of Eastern Greenland, supra note 120, at
71, the international court bound Norway to its Foreign Minister's letter since it represented the
position of the entire Norwegian Government.
155 See supra notes 50-58 and accompanying text.
156 See supra notes 68-78 and accompanying text.
The I.C.J., as a court of law, can only interpret international treaties; it cannot attempt to revise
them even if the consequences would not be satisfactory. 1 S. ROSENNE, THE LAW AND PRACTICE
OF THE INTERNATIONAL COURT 97 (1965). Thus, the Treaty of 1955 guaranteed the Chadian na-
tionality of the Aouzou Strip up to at least 1972 - the year in which Chadian President Tombalbaye
allegedly "ceded" the Aouzou Strip.
157 CONSTITUTION OF THE REPUBLIC OF CHAD, Apr. 16, 1962, reprinted in 1 CONsTrrU-
TIONS OF NATIONs 65, 66 (A. Peaslee 3d ed. 1965).
158 Id. at 67 (art. V).
159 Id.
160 Id. at 79 (art. LXX).
161 Id. at 79 (art. LXXI).
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Though the President of Chad is the Head of State, he is subject to
constitutional restrictions on his authority. The cession of the territory of
a State is indeed an act which requires the highest authorization. Clearly
evident from the Chadian Constitution, the President acts to maintain
the State's territorial integrity. Without express authority by the Chadian
Government, 162 an agreement of cession by the President could not be
binding as a matter of Chadian domestic law. Certainly any such agree-
ment of cession must be a manifest violation which would fall under the
purview of Article 46 of the Vienna Convention. 163 Cession of territory is
not normal practice. Libya, if acting in good faith, could not have reason-
ably relied on the Chadian President's authority to cede territory without
the complete consent of the Chadian Government. 164 Indeed, approval
by the entire Chadian Government was required. 65
Evidence of Libyan knowledge of the inherent lack of authority of a
Chadian President to enter into such an agreement is the secrecy sur-
rounding the agreement and the subsequent denial of such an agreement
in 1975.166 In addition, Libya has not until recently provided a photo-
copy of the letter, which is certainly subject to questions of validity.' 67
In applying the principles of cession to the facts, when Italy ac-
quired title to Libya in 1912, Italy did not acquire title to the Aouzou
Strip. The Aouzou Strip remained terra nuius until the successful
French occupation in 1914. The Treaty of Rome of 1935 never entered
into force since the required exchange of the instruments of ratification
never took place, Italy never occupied the area, and the Treaty was for-
mally made void by the Treaty of Peace with Italy. In addition, the
agreement of cession contained in the letter by the Chadian President
162 In this case the authority to cede the Aouzou Strip would more than likely emanate from a
constitutional amendment.
163 See supra text accompanying notes 148-49.
164 To draw an analogy, if President Bush were to mail a letter to Ottawa ceding Maine to
Canada, could the Canadian Government possibly be justified in relying on Bush's authority as
President without any further authorization by the Congress and the Supreme Court?
The Government of Chad, like that of the United States, is subject to constitutional restrictions
and is divided into three equal branches. The analogy is as applicable to the present case with Chad
and Libya as it was to the proposed scenario.
165 See supra note 139 and accompanying text.
166 It may be argued that since Libya began occupying the Aouzou Strip in 1973, and the
Chadian Government did not protest until 1977, the Chadian Government acquiesced in the cession.
However, the agreement of cession was secret between Colonel Kadhafy and President Tombalbaye;
the world did not learn of the occupation until 1975; Chad was preoccupied with its civil war. In
considering these circumstances, Chad's delay in protesting the Libyan occupation was reasonable
and does not evidence acquiescence.
167 See supra notes 89-93, 95-102 and accompanying text.
Irrespective of the letter's validity, Libya should have known, when conducting foreign relations
with a constitutional government of equally divided powers, that the President alone did not have
the authority to bind his Government.
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was a manifest violation of Chad's Constitution. Libya should have rea-
sonably known, and from the evidence it probably did know, that the
Chadian President was not authorized to conduct such a cession. Fur-
thermore, the validity of the photocopied letter is highly questionable.
Libya's claims, therefore, to the Aouzou Strip based on principles of ces-
sion will fail.
Uti Possidetis
In accordance with utipossidetis, when a State becomes independent
from its colonial power, the State automatically inherits its colonial
boundaries.168 Any efforts by another State to colonize, occupy, or other-
wise violate the State's territory after it has gained independence are inef-
fective and of no legal consequence upon the State's territorial
boundaries. 69 In short, "[a]s you possess, you shall continue to
possess."'17
The doctrine of utipossidetis was first widely employed by the Latin
American countries during the early nineteenth century. 17 1 In accord-
ance with this doctrine, title to a territory is granted even if the territory
has never been occupied by the newly independent State.1 72 In Latin
America, territories were "by common consent considered occupied in
law from the first hour by these newly created [S]tates." 173
The purpose of uti possidetis is to protect the independence and sta-
168 2 Whiteman, supra note 116, at 1087.
169 Id.
170 Id. at 1088 (quoting Case Concerning Sovereignty Over Certain Frontier Land, 1959 I.CJ.
209, 255).
Whenever possible, the I.C.J. applies equity infra legem to find an equitable solution derived
from the applicable law. Frontier Dispute Judgment, supra note 84, at 568 (quoting Fisheries Juris-
diction (W. Ger. v. Ice.), 1974 I.C.J. 175, 202). Equity infra legem guides the court in interpreting
and applying the law. Id. at 662.
This recent case before the I.C.J. concerned a border dispute between the African countries of
Burkina Faso (formerly Upper Volta) and Mali. Since both countries are members of the O.A.U.,
the court resolved to determine the borders in accordance with utipossidetis. Id. at 567.
In order to reconstruct the borders each country inherited from independence from France, the
court traced French mandates delimiting borders from the early 1900s. Id. at 570. The I.C.J. was
faced with creating a border from few points of reference and inaccurate charts. Judge Abi-Saab, in
describing the court's discretion to apply equity infra legem, stated that the fewer the facts available,
the greater the court's "degree of freedom." Id at 662. It follows, therefore, that the more facts
available, the less discretion the court has to apply equity infra legem. In the present dispute between
Chad and Libya, the boundary lines have been explicitly and clearly described since the Declaration
of 1899. Thus, this case is clearly distinguishable from the Burkina Faso-Mali dispute. The I.CJ. will
not have discretion to apply equity infra legem in determining the correct border and must strictly
adhere to the applicable international agreements. See 1 S. ROSENNE, supra note 156, at 97.
171 2 Whiteman, supra note 116, at 1087.
172 AMERICAN SOCIETY, supra note 139, at 299.
173 Id.
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bility of new States once the colonial power has left.'7 4 This protection
accorded to newly formed, weak governments eliminates the risk of chal-
lenges by aggressive neighbors to the borders of the new States. 17 The
doctrine is not generally accepted customary international law, 176 and
therefore is not binding upon States except when specifically agreed upon
by convention. 177
In 1963, the O.A.U. was formed and its Charter incorporated the
doctrine of uti possidetis. The subsequent Cairo Resolution of 1964178
formally defined this doctrine as preserving the boundaries inherited
from decolonization. 179 The principle of utipossidetis is applicable to all
African states which are members of the O.A.U., even if they became
independent before 1963.180 Since both Libya' 8 ' and Chad are signatories
to the Charter, they are both bound by it.
In 1950 when Libya became independent, its southern boundaries
were in question. The U.N. resolved that France and Libya should nego-
tiate between themselves a final, fixed border. The result was the Treaty
of 1955, delimiting the border between Libya and Chad in conformity
with the Declaration of 1899. The Treaty of 1955 affirmed the French
nationality of the Aouzou Strip.' 82
When Chad became independent in 1960, it automatically inherited
its colonial boundaries, including the Aouzou Strip, since all rights to the
territory were conveyed to it by France. Chad and Libya are bound to
respect their borders inherited from decolonization since they are signa-
tories to the O.A.U. Charter.'83 Therefore, Chad's possession is uncon-
testable under international law according to the principle of uti
possidetis. Occupation of the Aouzou Strip by Libya will not confer title
to it. Libya is obligated, under international law, to respect Chad's bor-
ders upon its independence.
174 Frontier Dispute Judgment, supra note 84, at 565. For an additional description of the
purpose of uti possidetis, see id at 661-62.
175 Id at 565. Utipossidetis was implemented to deter non-American States from further colo-
nization in Latin America. Any occupation of territory by a foreign State would not vest title.
AMERICAN SOETy, supra note 139, at 299.
176 2 Whiteman, supra note 116, at 1086. The principle is not recognized by the international
community as international law, which requires occupation as the foundation of sovereignty. Id
177 Id
178 See supra notes 82-86 and accompanying text.
179 Id
180 Frontier Dispute Judgment, supra note 84, at 567.
181 In a dispute over the continental shelf between Libya and Tunisia, Libya fully supported
the stability of the land frontier based on the principle of uti possidetis embodied in the O.A.U.
Charter. See Case Concerning the Continental Shelf (Tunisia v. Libya), 1982 I.C.J. 18, 66.
182 See supra notes 73-78 and accompanying text.
183 See supra notes 79-84 and accompanying text.
1991]
CASE W. RES. J. INT'L LV
Conquest
Title by conquest has recently become synonymous with cession
made under duress.184 Conquest was a term used to describe the territory
of an enemy State which had been effectively occupied during war and
then retained at the end of the war without confirmation in a treaty of
peace or other official document. 185 Hence, conquest conferred an incho-
ate title which had to be made valid by either complete subjugation of
the enemy State or by its silent acquiescence that the conquered territory
had fallen into the hands of the aggressor State.'86 In the first instance,
the extinction of the former sovereign left the territory as terra nuiius
184 C. FENwICK, supra note 141, at 424.
185 Id. Fenwick and von Glahn claim that when Italy had defeated Turkey in 1912, Italy did
not acquire title to Libya by a treaty of cession, but rather by prescription in presuming Turkey had
permanently abandoned its possession of Libya. They base their assertion on the Trattato di Pace
concluso fra l'Italia e la Turchid [Treaty of Peace Concluded between Italy and Turkey], Oct. 18,
1912, Italy-Turkey, 22 Trattati e Convenzioni Jan. 2, 1912-Dec. 31, 1913 (Italy), 217 C.T.S. 160,
which makes no reference to cession of Libya. C. FENWICK, supra note 141, at 424; G. VON GLAHN,
supra note 116, at 280. However, in the earlier Treaty of 1912, supra note 40, at 226, 217 C.T.S. at
137, the preamble states that Italy has proclaimed its sovereignty over Libya, and that Turkey has
formally recognized Italy's sovereignty over Libya. In addition, Annex 2, incorporated into the
Treaty by Article 9 of the Treaty, specifically declares that Libya "has been submitted under the full
and entire sovereignty of the Kingdom of Italy" pursuant to the law of Feb. 25, 1912. Id at 230, 217
C.T.S. at 139.
Since the Treaties are successive and relate to the same subject matter, article 30, paragraph 3 of
the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties applies. Article 30, paragraph 3 states that: "When
all the parties to the earlier treaty are parties also to the later treaty but the earlier treaty is not
terminated or suspended in operation under art. 59, the earlier treaty applies only to the extent that
its provisions are compatible with those of the later treaty." Vienna Convention, supra note 151, art.
30, para. 3.
Article 59 states in pertinent part that such a treaty will be void if.
(a) it appears from the later treaty or is otherwise established that the parties intended that
the matter should be governed by that treaty; or
(b) the provisions of the later treaty are so far incompatible with those of the earlier one
that the two treaties are not capable of being applied at the same time.
Id at 310.
Due to the fact the later treaty did not void the earlier, the later treaty was more concerned with
continued trade and tariffs, and from the actions of the contracting parties the earlier treaty was
intended to remain in force and was compatible with the later treaty, Article 30 of the Convention
applies. Therefore the earlier Treaty of 1912 remained en vigueur. Italy thereby acquired title to
Libya by a treaty of cession and not through conquest. Hence, possible Libyan claims arising from
their Turkish heritage to title to the Aouzou Strip based on a lack of time for prescription to take
effect, thereby denying France title to the territory, will not hold. In addition, according to the
principles of occupation, Turkey would have lost title to the Aouzou Strip by dereliction. In any
event, the Treaty of 1955 finally delimiting the border would extinguish any such claims by Libya.
186 C. FENWICK, supra note 141, at 424. In addition to silent acquiescence, title could be con-
solidated by the defeated State's recognition of, or consent to, the aggressor State's sovereignty. See
AMERICAN SocIETY, supra note 139, at 297-98.
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whereby title could be conferred by occupation.187 In the second in-
stance, title could be conferred by prescription based on the presumption
the former sovereign had abandoned the territory.' In order for title to
be effectuated by prescription, the aggressor State must thereafter peace-
fully and continuously assert its jurisdiction over the territory
long enough to enable any Power who might have considered herself as
possessing sovereignty over the [territory], or having claim to sover-
eignty, to have, according to local conditions, a reasonable possibility
for ascertaining the existence of a state of things contrary to her real or
alleged rights. 189
In addition, sovereignty must have been imposed over the territory
for such a period of time that there exists a conviction amongst the inter-
national community that the present condition of the territory is in con-
formity with international order. 190
Since the adoption of the Covenant of the League of Nations in
1920, these forms of aggressive territorial acquisition appear to have lost
their validity. 91 The U.N. Charter stipulates the duty of member States
to refrain from the use of force against the territorial integrity of other
States.192 As far as member States are concerned, the U.N. Charter has
ended the legality of territorial acquisition by conquest. 193
When Libya began its occupation of the Aouzou Strip in 1973, it
breached its duty under the O.A.U. Charter to respect and refrain from
violating the territorial integrity of Chad.194 The ensuing armed conflict
between Chad and Libya left Libya in possession of the Aouzou Strip, 195
thereby in violation of its U.N. Charter duties. Present day international
law will not grant legal title to Libya from actions in contravention of its
charter obligations. Moreover, the principle of uti possidetis, to which
187 C. FENWiCK, supra note 141, at 424.
188 Id
189 Island of Palmas case, 1_ Int'l Arb. Awards at 829, 867.
190 OPPENHEIM, supra note 116, at 576.
191 C. FENWICK, supra note 141, at 425.
192 The U.N. Charter, Article 2, Paragraph 4 states that "[a]il Members shall refrain in their
international relations from the threat of or use of force against the territorial integrity or political
independence of any state." H. STEINER & D. VAGTS, TRANSNATIONAL LEGAL PROBLEMS, 40
(Supp. 1986).
193 G. VON GLAHN, supra note 116, at 281-82.
There is authority which supports the validity of title to territory obtained by traditional princi-
ples of conquest. According to AMERICAN SOCIETY, supra note 139, at 298, the duty in Article 2,
Paragraph 4 of the United Nations Charter to refrain from the use of force against the territorial
integrity of a State does not exclude territorial acquisition by force. It is asserted that the only
consequences of a breach of this duty are expulsion from the U.N. and enforcement measures by the
Security Council. Id. Even if this may be the case, Libya would still not be able to acquire title even
by traditional principles of conquest. See infra text following note 193.
194 See supra notes 82-86 and accompanying text.
195 See supra notes 90, 107 and accompanying text.
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Libya is bound,196 prohibits any acquisition of territory through the vio-
lation of a State's territorial integrity.
Even under the traditional principles of conquest, Libya may not
acquire title to the Aouzou Strip by way of prescription. 9 7 Title by con-
quest is precluded since Chad denounced, in 1977, the Libyan presence
within a reasonable amount of time.19 The condemnation by Chad and
subsequent struggle to regain control evidence a Chadian intent not to
abandon the Aouzou Strip. In addition, several African States have
strongly denounced Libya's occupation of the Aouzou Strip,' 99 thereby
signifying the occupation's divergence from international order. Hence,
Libya may not assert a claim of title to the Aouzou Strip based on
conquest.
CONCLUSION
From an examination of the legal principles of territorial acquisi-
tion, it is evident that the Aouzou Strip has been an integral part of Chad
since 1914. Though Turkey briefly acquired title to the territory from
about 1906 to 1912, the subsequent war with Italy resulting in the cession
of Libya terminated Turkey's title. Italy, having declared to France that
it would respect the Declaration of 1899, was estopped from acquiring
title to the Aouzou Strip.
France gained title to the Aouzou Strip in 1914 through occupation.
Since the instruments of ratification of the Treaty of Rome of 1935 had
never been exchanged, Italy had never taken possession, and because the
Treaty of 1947 nullified the Treaty of Rome, the Aouzou Strip was never
ceded to Italy. In addition, the Treaty of 1955 between France and Libya
cemented the border in conformity with the Declaration of 1899. Further
strengthening of the boundary line was Chad's emergence as a sovereign
State. Chad's succession to its colonial boundaries was assured by the
doctrine of uti possidetis.
The letter of 1973 from Chadian President Tombalbaye to Colonel
Kadhafy is void due to Article 46 of the Vienna Convention. In addition,
Libyan violations of Chad's territorial integrity will not confer upon
Libya title to the Aouzou Strip. These aggressive actions by Libya are in
contravention to the Charters of the U.N. and the O.A.U. The I.C.J.
196 See supra notes 180-81 and accompanying text.
197 See supra note 116 discussing why prescription cannot operate.
198 The determination of the reasonableness of delay is derived from considerations of Chad's
series of new governments, Chad's ensuing civil war, the Libyan occupation not publicly known until
1975, and Libya's denial that it was annexing the territory in 1975. See supra notes 94-98 and accom-
panying text. This determination is made pursuant to the test set forth in the text of supra note 189.
199 See generally 38 U.N. SCOR (2419th mtg.), U.N. Doc. S/PV 2419 (1983).
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cannot permit Libya to fall short of its obligations under the Charters,
and must determine the Aouzou Strip to be an integral part of Chad.
Robert W. McKeon, Jr. *
* J.D. Candidate, Case Western Reserve School of Law (1991), M.A., Middlebury College
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APPENDIX
1898 France-Great Britain: Convention for the Delimitation of Posses-
sions West and East of the Niger.
1899 France-Great Britain: Declaration fixing the northern border of
Chad.
1902 Italy-France: Letter from Italian Foreign Minister accepting the
declared northern border of Chad.
1902 France-Italy: Letter from French Foreign Minister assuring It-
aly of the limit of French expansion north.
1912 Italy-Turkey: Peace treaty whereby Turkey ceded Libya to Italy.
1915 Italy-Allied Powers: Concessions to Italy in Africa for its en-
trance into the War.
1919 France-Great Britain: Reaffirmation of the Declaration of 1899.
1919 France-Italy France: cedes some territory to Italy in Africa.
1935 France-Italy: Treaty of Rome, ceding the Aouzou Strip to Italy
(instruments of ratification never exchanged).
1938 Italy-France: Italy denies validity of the Treaty of Rome.
1940 Italy-France: Declaration of War
1947 Italy-Allied Powers: Treaty of Peace with Italy whereby Italy re-
linquishes possessions in Africa.
1951 Libya: achieves independence.
1955 Libya-France: Treaty of 1955, reaffirming the border set by the
Declaration of 1899.
1960 Chad achieves independence.
1963 Organization of African Unity formed, Chad and Libya are
members.
1972 Chad-Libya: Secret letter of cession of the Aouzou Strip by
Chadian President Tombalbaye to Libyan leader Colonel
Kadhafy.
1973 Libya occupies the Aouzou Strip.
1977 Chad protests the Libyan occupation.
1989 Chad-Libya: Agreement to submit the territorial dispute to the
I.C.J. if the dispute cannot be resolved by political means within
one year.
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